The Leader's Challenge: Installation or Realization

This is a very interesting article written by Stephen Conner showing us the stages of corporate change initiatives and pointing out where and why most of the initiatives fail.  One aspect of this essay that really caught my attention is that the descriptions, stages and categories that Conner describes are appropriate not only for describing business decisions and changes but also can be easily used to analyze any change process. 

 

Conner opens his essay by explaining the major misconception that many corporations fact when implementing change; they “confuse installation of their projects with the realization of their intent”.  He states that “all too often, important initiatives are properly installed but the returns expected from the investments made never seems to actually take form”.  We can easily see how this “poor application” and lack of follow though and monitoring could potentially be very damaging both monetarily and culturally for a corporation.  Conner allocates change initiatives to that “fail” are the ones that are “only partially implemented” or the ones that are “never really used as intended”.  The major reasons that Conner points to for these categories of “failure” are; “lack of understanding of the true intent and scope of the effort, mixed signals from management about its importance, resistance from those being affected, competition for time and attention from too many other changes, and so on”. 

 

Conner does a wonderful job of expressing the importance of using both project management and change management to allow change initiatives to realize their full and intended potential.  Conner points out that “project management alone does not adequately address the human dynamics of change which will ultimately result in installation – type only outcomes.” Conner continues that his paper will focus on change management, not because it is more important but because it is more neglected.”

 

All of the above scenarios describe situations that Conner proposes are only “installed”.  These types of changes are pretty obvious to recognize for anyone with some experience on the subject matter at hand.  The first example that comes to mind is our countries present situation regarding the wars in both Iraq and Afghanistan.  We announced that we will be sending over approximately 30,000 more troops to Afghanistan but we have not really addressed the “human landscape” of our initiative.  We do not have a clear purpose on “why” we are sending more troops overseas to fight.  We have very good “strategies” on how to “deploy” our forces but we have done this several times in our recent history and still seem to be missing the point that we have not figured out “how” to implement out plans “in such a way that they have their real intended impact.”  We seem to have fallen victim to all of the points that Conner associates with “poor application” and impending failure. 

 

In his paper Conner does a good job of explaining the importance of the “human landscape” and how important it is when initiating change.  He explains the “without people, meaningful integration of the various inert components wouldn’t exist: A procedure could stand alone, unaffected by a report showing declining quality, which would be completely detached from employed performance ratings, which would be unrelated to the new IT system, which would be sheltered from any influence by the recent merger.  It is because there is a human quality to these landscapes that interdependencies are possible.”  Conner is pointing out the fact that if all aspects, “the total system” that is affected by the change initiative in question is not taken into full consideration, then the initiative is only “partially installed” and will not produce the intended results.  In our current situation overseas, from a “concerned citizen’s perspective”, we do not fully understand or have the support required to succeed in this endeavor.

 

Connor’s paper goes on to explain the “executive’s moment of truth”, the point in time when after implementing the “right course of action” it is realized whether or not the intended outcome has been realized. 

 

The four possible outcomes that may be present:

 

Early Termination – This is explained as when everything looks like it is a “GO”, all budgets and agreements are in place but prior to any “official” announcements take place, everything is discontinued.

 

Meltdown- “A project is announced and engaged, but at some point during implementation, it is discontinued with a complete withdrawal of resources and activity. Meltdowns are visible for all to see, and the economic and political prices they incur are so costly they are generally avoided if at all possible”.  It is easy to see how situation could lead to “escalating commitment.”

 

Installation- “When change projects are first introduced into a work setting, they are announced, set up, assembled, and/or inaugurated, but the ultimate intent has not been achieved.  Conner explains that with installation comes a two edged sword, one carried the potential for furthering the primary purpose of the intended change while the other possible outcome is that installation could prevent the change from ever truly taking form.

 

    Beneficial Installation – Process where the actual “physical” installation of the change process.

 

    Dysfunctional Installation – “Installation becomes dysfunctional when it becomes an end state and not a phase in the implementation process”.

 

Realization – “This kind of outcomes takes place when the key purpose for the entire initiative is actually achieved.  Conner states that “realizing change requires fulfilling the “promise” made to shareholders”.

 

To briefly explore Conner examples of why “organizations that do no more than install major change almost never create the support and acceptance needed to produce the hoped for results.”  Through listening to the last Presidential Address and all of the press coverage and interviews following the, it is obvious that enough support for this military “surge” is not in place for it to be successful in the long term. 

 

There is a lack of understanding in the public over exactly why we are chasing terrorist in there own back yard while both the death toll of our soldiers and the cost of the operation are at unacceptable levels and increasing. 

 

There is no defined objective that has been put out by the administration; there is no goal and no stated purpose (that is achievable through the current and proposed actions).  The administration is confused.  The administration is being bombarded with semi support and total opposition at the same time regarding the importance of this “surge”.  There is resistance in the ranks of the military, the military families and the public at large regarding the increase in troops and both wars in general.  The administration is also under extreme pressure over our current financial situation in this country and this constant struggle over two enormous “changes” and the countless other items they are dealing with contributes to the difficulty of their decisions.

 

The President of the United States has and is facing the “Ultimate Leader’s Challenge”.  The administration is not making a very good decision with the announcement of sending the 30,000 additional troops to Afghanistan while at the same time divulging a timeline to exit the theater.  This senario fits the definition of “installation” that Conner presents.  Although it requires the final outcome to say whether or not the espoused goals (still confused on what they are) are realized, Obama has made a “promise” to the only stakeholders that should matter to him, The American People.  Of the four key elements to the human landscape readiness that Connor explains, although arguably, the Administration has missed the mark on all four. 

 

We will now take a brief look at how our current political situation regarding Afghanistan fits in with Conner’s “four key elements to human landscape readiness”;

 

Sponsors: The military – with out having complete support of the Commanding Generals to begin with, Obama undermined any support that he had by stating that the troops would be deployed for 18 months.  To properly prepare for this type of deployment is takes approximately 12 months and that is if there are enough of the appropriate recourses (which there are not).

 

Target:  Terrorist will not be influenced by this “surge”; they will take an 18 month vacation in their caves and return to thier reign of terror as soon as we demobilize.

 

Culture:  The difference in the cultures involved are to large to address here.

 

Capacity:  30,000 troops (ground) deployed to this theater is not enough power to accomplish the undeclared mission.  This really leaves the impression that this effort will most likely end in either a “meltdown or installation”.

 

We can only hope than when Obama faces his “Moment of Truth” that the United States has not taken any more casualties.

 

Dale Thistle